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Chapter 3 
Consolidation and Improvement. 
Fire and Rescue under the New Labour Administrations 2005-2010 
Pete Murphy and Kirsten Greenhalgh 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the experience and performance of the Fire and Rescue Services in the period 
2005-2010. It included the final New Labour administration of Tony Blair and the period from 2007 
when Gordon Brown was Prime Minister. Unlike the previous period which was a turbulent period of 
change when industrial relations and human resource management issues tended to predominate, this was 
a period of consolidation and relative stability when performance management and service improvement 
issues increasingly tended to dominate the agenda.      
The general election of May 2005 was the third election that the labour party, under Tony Blair, won. 
Although its majority in the House of Commons was reduced to 66 seats from the 160 seat majority it 
had held over the previous four years, the outcome was not really in doubt1. The liberal democrats saw 
their share of the popular vote rise and they won more seats than any third party since 1923. Despite 
losing popularity over the Iraq war, Labour campaigned on the basis of a strong economy, while the 
conservatives under, Michael Howard, campaigned on immigration, improving the NHS and reducing 
crime rates.      
The focus on public sector reform and the need to improve public services was a key feature of the 
campaign that became a central pillar of the new administration. It also featured strongly in the Queen’s 
speech to the opening of parliament. 
“My government will build on their programme of reform and accelerate modernisation of the public services to 
promote opportunity and fairness. My government will bring forward legislation in the key areas of public 
services delivery: education; health; welfare; and crime.”   
(The Queen’s Speech. May 2005). 
The new emphasis on planning prevention and protection, and the key themes of modernisation, public 
service delivery alignment and collaborative working across the public sector, established in the previous 
period, with local authorities in the vanguard, was set to continue and, if anything, become even more 
influential.    
Many of the elements or work steams of the original modernisation agenda, which are shown in table 1 in 
the previous chapter, were built upon and developed between 2005 and 2010. Figure 1 below attempts to 
show some (but not all) of the initiatives and their development into the post 2005 period. 
The service entered this period under the continuing policy jurisdiction of the ODPM, although in May 
2006 departmental responsibilities, including Fire and Rescue, were transferred to the newly created 
Department of Communities and Local Government under a new Secretary of State Ruth Kelly. A 
dedicated Fire Minister was retained in the new department but whereas Nick Raynsford had been Fire 
Minister for the previous four years over the succeeding five years, five ministers held the portfolio. Jim 
Fitzpatrick (2005-06) a former Firefighter was succeeded by Angela Smith (2006-07), Parmjit Dhanda 
(2007-08), Sadiq Khan (2008-09) and Anne Snelgrove (2009-10).  
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Figure 1. The developing Modernisation Agenda, Source: Jones 2013 
The two central of the new government’s initial drive to continue to improve local public services 
individually and collectively, where the second generation of Comprehensive Performance Assessments 
(CPAs) and the replacement of Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) with Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs) (ODPM 2004, DCLG 2006).  Both directly involved the newly renamed Fire and Rescue Services. 
In addition, 2005 saw the publication of the second national framework for fire and rescue services 
(ODPM 2006), and a new approach to regulation, termed as strategic regulation (Audit Commission 
2003) and the inspection of public services by all the inspectorates and regulatory bodies for locally 
delivered public services, summed up in the title of the OPSR report ‘Inspecting for Improvement’ 
(OPSR 2003a, 2003b, Davis et al 2004, Davis and Martin 2008, Downe 2008).  
This chapter will explore each of these in turn before looking at the final part of the new labour era under 
Gordon Brown, when Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAA) replaced CPA, a second generation of 
Local Agreements were agreed and the second National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services 2008-
2011 was published. The brown administration was also the period of the great recession and the onset of 
austerity and public sector financial restraints which came to dominate the next period of Conservative 
led coalition government between 2010 and 2015.  
The 2005-2008 Comprehensive Performance Assessment Regime. 
Following the 2004 verification reports (Audit Commission 2004a, 2004b) by the end of the second Blair 
administration there was general agreement between central and local government, the local government 
regulators and the inspectorates that a radical review and updating of the local government CPA regime 
was required.  
“Unlike the introduction of Best Value and the first iterations of CPA, the general principle and desirability of 
a new version was relatively uncontested. By 2005 it was generally accepted, albeit grudgingly, that CPA had 
generated substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements across local government services as well as 
significant efficiencies in their running costs (Martin and Bovaird 2005). Nevertheless, all parties considered 
that it could be significantly improved (Martin 2006, Ashworth et al 2010). There were clearly lessons to be 
learned from the implementation of the previous regimes, and from the two rounds of Fire Service verifications 
undertaken by the Audit Commission, as well as from performance management regimes in other sectors such 
as the police, education and health”.  
(Murphy and Greenhalgh 2013 p.227)  
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The Office of Public Service Reform (OPSR) within the Prime Minister’s Office, had produced its report 
‘Inspecting for Improvement’ as well as the government’s new inspection strategy for public services 
(OPSR 2003a, 2003b, Davis and Martin 2008). The 2005 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), and 
the associated Public Service Agreements for Whitehall spending departments, (HMT 2004) had signalled 
a move to a new set of national objectives for the public sector focused on local outcomes within 
communities rather than input or output measures for individual public services. They therefore 
encouraged collaboration across Whitehall departments and sought to re-enforce the connections 
between public services at the local authority level. 
In 2005, ‘CPA the harder test’ (Audit Commission 2005) was published by the Audit Commission. By this 
time, as a result of the OPSR report, the Audit Commission had formally taken on the role of co-
ordinating the various inspectorates and regulators that monitored and assessed locally delivered public 
services (Campbell-Smith 2008). It was also rolling out what it called ‘strategic regulation’ and envisioning 
fewer but more strategic performance frameworks and inspections across the public services (Audit 
Commission 2003, 2006).  
The new CPA methodology not only looked at how a council was performing as a corporate and service 
delivery organisation, but also as community leaders and collaborative partners to other local services. 
The new methodology also included a specific service assessment for the Fire and Rescue Services.  
CPA for fire and rescue services was to be fully aligned and built on the principles and processes for CPA 
in local government but it was also intended to address issues specific to fire and rescue authorities. 
However, because of political sensitivities and the quality and quantity of comparative information 
available, the first Fire Assessment in 2005 looked only at back-office functions. These were, however, 
quickly followed in 2006 by assessments of the whole services, that included operational services and 
emergency preparedness as well as back-office services (Audit Commission, 2006, 2007).  
From 2006, a Fire and Rescue Service Assessment was included in the overall framework for CPA for 
those 13 councils with sole responsibility for Fire and Rescue Service in their area and the same 
methodology was applied to the (then) 32 other combined and metropolitan Fire and Rescue Services and 
to the London Fire and Rescue Service. Figure 2, below, was the generic diagram used by the Audit 
Commission to summarise the new CPA framework as a whole while figure 3 summarises the Fire and 
Rescue Service Assessment model. 
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The 2006 Fire and Rescue CPA was a 
corporate assessment that attempted to 
assess performance across both national 
and local priorities for the service and 
evaluate the fire authority’s response to 
meeting the needs of the local 
community. The methodology employed 
used a self-assessment, completed to an 
Audit Commission template; a peer 
challenge (provided by peers, both 
officers and elected politicians from 
outside services on the assessments 
teams) and an external inspection from 
an Audit Commission team. These 
assessments, were complimented by an 
evaluation of how economically, 
efficiently and effectively the services 
was making use of the resources 
available to it, and an evaluation of 
whether the service was improving sufficiently rapidly – the latter being called a ‘direction of travel’ 
assessment.   
All of these judgements, were based upon explicit and publically available ‘Key Lines of Enquiry2’ 
(KLOEs), supported by detailed diagnostic guidance. All elements, together with the scoring and 
weightings used in the subsequent judgements, were developed in consultation with the government, the 
local authorities the fire services, and, at least by intention, the public.  
The evaluation components and 
techniques, which are shown on 
Figure 3 below, were by 2005 
becoming tried and tested parts 
of the wider regulation and 
inspection regime within the 
public sector, although as 
mentioned above the initial 2005 
assessments were not actually 
‘comprehensive’, as they 
primarily related to back-office 
functions.  
 
The early assessments were 
however both dependent on a 
very limited and immature 
evidential base, as the earlier 
verification exercises in 2003 and 
2004 had revealed. Figure 4 
below gives a four-stage generic 
typology for the development of 
evidential bases. It was designed for use in performance management regimes, and can be applied to 
individual services, to organisations or to whole sectors. It identifies four ‘characteristic’ stages, from 
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undeveloped immature information environments (data poor environments) to robust mature evidence 
bases (suitable for self-regulation). There are indicative descriptors included for each of the four stages, 
although in practice the reality is always likely to be more complicated than tis simplistic model implies. 
 
It is however clear from 
this typology that in 2005, 
despite Fire services being 
part of the Audit 
Commission’s and later 
the government ‘s 
successive generations of 
national performance 
indicators since they were 
established in 1995, Fire 
and Rescue Services still 
had only a ‘data-poor’ 
evidential base from 
which to operate, 
benchmark and assess 
performance and 
improvement. 
In 2005 the forty-six3 fire authorities were assessed under CPA and were also required to produce their 
annual ‘Use of Resources’ Assessments. The results of these are shown in table 1 below which shows the 
overall performance and the performance by type of authority.   However, the fact is, that in 2005 63% of 
fire and rescue authorities were only performing ‘at or below’ minimum standards as shown by the 
individual authority scores at August 2005 (Audit Commission 2006).    
 The Audit Commission assessment concluded that:- 
“Whilst there is a clear appetite for change in fire and rescue authorities the pace varies substantially and 
improvement has not been achieved to the extent that might be expected…..only a small proportion of fire and 
rescue authorities are performing across the board at above minimum requirements”  
(Audit Commission 2006 p.2). 
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Figure 5. 2006 Fire CPA results 
In a section on ‘next steps for supporting improvement’, it adopted the now prevailing collaborative 
approach to public service improvement.  It set out what it anticipated that the government would do to 
improve the situation; what the commission itself would do; what the improvement organisations would 
do, and what it expected the fire authorities themselves to do. It also gave a foretaste of its proposals for 
the next round of CPA so that all Fire services could better prepare.  
The authorities found to be in the lowest ‘poor’ and ‘weak’ performance categories, became subjected to a 
central government improvement and intervention regime. This essentially consisted of appointing a 
‘Lead Official’ to act as the chair and co-ordinator of a Government Monitoring Board, and provide 
direct liaison with the government’s fire minister. The monitoring board would be responsible for 
drawing up and implementing an improvement or recovery plan. In so doing, it was to be aided, and 
could call directly upon the resources of the Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA), the Audit 
Commission, and the Local Government Leadership Centre (LGLC) together with assistance from other 
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fire and rescue services and from local authorities. It could also commission services from the private 
sector, if necessary.  
This regime was explicitly built on the ‘intervention’ model which had been developed for significantly 
underperforming Local Authorities and individual local authority services, under the CPA regime since 
2002 (ODPM 2003, Jones 2013, Murphy and Jones 2016). The generic model was by this stage robust 
and well trialled and was subsequently applied to other sectors including the NHS.   
All of the remaining fire authorities, however, also had available to them capacity and capability, 
innovation and improvement tools, techniques, programmes and guidance from these same improvement 
agencies. By the time the CPA results for 2006 were published in late 2007, the majority, 37 (80%) of the 
fire and rescue services were rated as improving ‘well’ or ‘strongly’ (the top two categories). In addition, 
the scores for the annual ‘Use of Resources’ assessment showed equally impressive improvement.  
 
Although Fire and Rescue Services 
were initially reluctant and were late 
to become involved in CPA, it is 
fair to say that they benefited from 
the lessons learned by both the 
Audit Commission, the 
government and the local 
authorities in the early days of CPA 
(Audit Commission 2006, 2007, 
2008a, 2009b). The key 
stakeholders were therefore able to 
capture, disseminate share and 
apply, lessons learned, 
demonstrable good practice and 
organizational and systemic 
innovation from their peers. By 
2009 when the Audit Commission 
published its overall assessment of 
the impact of CPA between 2002 
and 2008, few argued with their 
view that CPA had achieved its 
objectives of stimulating service 
improvement and efficiency in Fire 
and Rescue Services as well as in 
wider local government (Audit 
Commission 2008a, 2009a, 2009b).  
In terms of financial 
improvements, in addition to the 
annual 2% that HMT assumes will 
be achieved as a result of 
technological innovation and other 
generic improvements, and 
therefore builds into its annual financial allocations, local government services were making annual 
cumulative financial saving of between 3 and 4%. Similarly, in terms of service improvement, because of 
the requirement for continuous improvement and the relative nature of a lot of the national indicators, to 
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attain the same level of performance from one year to the next on national indicators required an actual 
improvement on average of about 3%4.   Thus the improvements in the tables below appear less 
impressive than the actualité’. 
The quest for continuous improvement was not however over and in 2009 CPA was replaced, by a new 
regime called Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAA). This was foreshadowed in the 2007 Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act. In 2008 the government also published the second 
National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services for the period 2008-2011 which was inter-related with 
the new CAA regime. However, in order to understand the thinking and philosophy behind these changes 
it is necessary to understand the development of a second major driver of public service improvement 
between 2005 and 2009 namely the Local Area Agreements. 
Local Area Agreements. 
Local Area Agreements (LAAs) had been introduced in 2004, as a development of the previous Local 
Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) between Central and Local Government. Like their predecessors, 
they were a mechanism for achieving challenging targets for improved service delivery based on national 
and local policy priorities. As a reward for achieving agreed performance targets, local authorities and 
their local partners would receive additional monetary reward and a reduction in central government 
regulation over particular activities.  
LAAs were negotiated with 150 Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) rather than with local authorities, 
although the authorities were expected to lead negotiations on behalf of the partnerships. They were 3-
year agreements focussing on revenue rather than capital expenditure and were geographically defined by 
individual local authority boundaries. From the start Fire and Rescue Services, who were members of all 
Local Strategic Partnerships, were also actively engaged in LAAs. In March 2005, the first round of 21 
‘pathfinder’ LAAs were signed-off by central government and local area representatives.  
In return for achieving mutually agreed ‘stretch’ targets for improving local delivery of priority services, 
local area partners would be rewarded through financial incentives and so-called freedoms and 
flexibilities’ from central government regulations. Although the objectives, priorities and targets for the 
first agreements were organised around 3 ‘blocks’ of service areas (Community Safety, Children and 
Young People and Older Peoples Services) this was quickly developed into four slightly more 
comprehensive blocks that then endured for the life of LAAs.  The second round of 66 agreements were 
signed in March 2006 and the final 62 in March 2007, by which time every large local authority, every 
Police and Fire Authority and every Primary Care Trust (PCT) from the NHS, together with hundreds of 
their delivery partners were working collaboratively across the country to deliver LAAs. 
They key issues for individual LAAs arose from the Sustainable Community Strategy5 for an area and 
these were corralled around four baskets of services and activities, universally referred to as blocks. 
 Safer and Stronger Communities, which were proposals for improving community safety and 
building more resilient local communities, 
 Children and Young Peoples Services, which included ambitions such as raising attainment levels 
in schools or reducing teenage pregnancies in an area,  
 Healthier Communities and Older Peoples Services which essentially embraced public health, 
social care and wellbeing issues, and  
 Economic development, enterprise and innovation in the local economy. 
Local budgets and efforts were pooled, co-ordinated or rationalised to achieve outcomes agreed on both 
national and local priorities (see figure 4 below). Each of the four blocks had to have agreed outcome 
targets, sub-outcomes, indicator targets and delivery activities. Three types of funding went into the 
agreements.  
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 Mainstream funding from central and local sources which could be aligned against specific LAA 
outcomes and targets 
 Area specific funding from government departments to local areas which could be pooled in an 
LAA,  
 Non-Departmental Public Bodies funding which they could choose to align with LAAs.   
 
Figure 5. The Local Are Agreement Regime 
LAAs led to more effective joining up, co-ordination of local public services and significantly improved 
outcomes for local communities. They also led to better informed and more economic, efficient and 
effective government at both the national and local levels. Whitehall departments, as well as local delivery 
agencies, had to strategically align objectives and policies into mutually reinforcing strategies that would 
lead to improved outcomes for communities. 
As the potential success of the three rounds of pilots became clear the 2006 Local Government White 
Paper and the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act that followed, made LAAs a key 
performance management and priority setting tool for local areas. Place and place shaping entered the 
lexicon of national and local government language and a new series of LAAs were a key part of the new 
ambitions and arrangements6. 
Local Authorities were vested with the duty to lead and enable LSPs in the preparation of new LAAs with 
much wider partner involvement. The act listed 21 types of organisations with a duty to co-operate and 
have regard to the targets. It strengthened involvement of the third sector, simplified funding within 
LAAs and encouraged a move from four blocks (allegedly encouraging a silo service mentality) to four 
cross cutting themes. Prevention and protection rather than cure and reaction, rose even further up the 
policy priorities at national and local levels. 
Although a new (much reduced) national indicator set was produced7, there was a much greater focus on 
local priorities. A ‘dry run’ of negotiations was undertaken with 17 areas to generate good practice and 
ensure a local focus could be maintained. New LAAs had to build a coherent narrative, tell a story, and 
develop the vision of the local ‘place’. The local evidential base therefore had to be built and refined8 to 
underpin any decisions or targets and justify priorities in negotiations with central government. 
Negotiations with central government were conducted through the Government Regional Offices and the 
whole regime was made open and transparent with a single dedicated publically accessible LAA website, 
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acting as the central repository for all agreements and every target. New Local Area Agreements were 
successfully agreed for all 150 LSPs as previous agreements reached their termination dates, and a further 
round were negotiated prior to the 2010 general election and were  subsequently implemented over the 
next three years. 
In July 2010, immediately after the election, the coalition government’s new Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government, Eric Pickles announced the end of any further LAA’s’ the abolition 
of the Audit Commission and the closing of Government Regional Offices. This was followed by the 
Chancellor George Osborne announcing the (misnamed) ‘Bonfire of the QUANGOs9’ which included 
the dismantling of much of the systemic improvement infrastructure designed to support local 
authorities, the police, the NHS and Fire and Rescue Services to improve their services to the public10. 
These abrupt policy changes, effectively brought to an end the period of joined up policy and delivery and 
an era of unprecedented vertical collaboration between central and local government and horizontal 
collaboration between public and voluntary services within local communities. However, before we 
examine the Coalition Government years between 2010 and 2015, we need to look at how these 
collaborative principles were developed and enshrined in the two National Frameworks for Fire and 
Rescue Services which was published in 2005 and 2008 and covered the periods 2005-2008 and 2008-
2011.  LAAs, Crime and Disorder Partnerships and community safety strategies had encouraged and 
enabled Fire and Rescue Services to collaborate with local delivery partners, the National Frameworks 
focussed on national and local emergency services and their preparations and responses to local and 
national incidents.          
The National Fire and Rescue Frameworks 2006-2008 and 2008-2011, 
The second National Framework covered a two year period and the third framework covered a three year 
period.  The second followed a very similar scope, content and structure to the one adopted for the first 
framework although it clearly moved on in terms of objectives and targets. The third national framework 
was noticeably slimmed-down and less prescriptive.   
These frameworks attempted to complement and, where possible, integrate with the developing 
performance management regime for the sector. They were also increasingly the product of co-design 
between the government and the fire and rescue sector as a whole. Relations between the government 
and the fire sector and the fire sector and the public both continued to improve, as public satisfaction and 
regard to the fire sector returned to some of the highest levels of trust and confidence experienced by 
public services. 
With each iteration of the fire service framework the emphasis on prevention and protection became 
more pronounced as the performance of the service continually improved. In 2013 the then government 
Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, Sir Ken Knight, reflected this in his comment, 
“It is clear that the cumulative effect of building and furniture regulations, Integrated Risk Management Planning, 
and the localisation of decision making, and importantly the fire prevention and protection work carried out by fire 
and rescue authorities has significantly reduced the risk of fire in England” 
 (Knight 2013, p.12) 
The second National Framework reflected and complemented the later iterations of the CPA regime, the 
fist generation of LAAs and the final Tony Blair administration. The third National Framework was 
aligned with the CAA, the second generation of LAAs and the administration of Gordon Brown as prime 
Minister. 
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Comprehensive Area Assessment and the new generation of LAAs 
Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAAs) were introduced by the 2007 Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act, which also heralded a new 3-year Comprehensive Spending Review; a new set 
of Public Service Agreements for Whitehall delivery departments, a new national indicator set and the 
second generation of LAAs described above.  They were only carried out once, and were intended to 
assess the performance and impact of local public services on local communities in 2008-2009. This 
impact was to be measured both collectively and individually.  
Like the new PSA’s they were intended to be outcome focused and to ensure locally delivered public 
services were aligned, joined up, or integrated wherever possible. They were to be based on collectively 
agreed local objectives and priorities and to be delivered in the most economic, efficient and effective 
ways possible. They were also to seek to achieve more sustainable and more equable outcomes for local 
communities.  
CAA was integral to the third National Framework (DCLG 2008) and consisted of an area assessment of 
the impact or outcomes being achieved collectively by the key public services within a geographical area, 
complemented by an individual organisational assessment for these key local public service providers. 
This group included the core members of the Local Strategic Partnership i.e. the local authorities, the 
Primary Care Trusts (part of whome’s formal duty was to lead and co-ordinate the local NHS), the local 
Police Authority and the Fire and Rescue Authority.  
For Fire and Rescue Services it included the first ‘operational service assessments’ of Fire and Rescue 
Services (DCLG 2008) and for all parties it included a common ‘Use of Resources’ Assessment to be 
carried out by the same external auditors11 for each of the services in a single area. A new ‘Use of 
Resources’ model designed, inter alia, to exclude the shifting of costs from one public service to another, 
was rolled out annually from 2007. It included an assessment of the use and management of all human, 
financial and physical resources and it embraced the assessment across short, medium and long term 
horizons. The ‘Use of Resources ‘assessment had come a long way from the simple assessment of the 
content and publication of the annual financial accounts in the first CPA in 2001.   
As well as the generic area assessment, specific organisational assessments were  developed and carried 
out on all of the 46 FRS, as well as all local authorities12 PCTs13, territorial police constabularies14, figure 6, 
with the results published on the Audit Commissions dedicated “One Place” website (Audit Commission 
2010). 
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Figure 6. LAA Methodology, Source: Audit Commission 
LAAs became a key part of the area assessment, while an operational assessment, together with the Use 
of Resources Assessment, where key parts of the FRS organisational assessment. 
To facilitate benchmarking, sharing and dissemination of ideas, lessons learned and good practice three 
dedicated, open access, interoperable and real time websites were established. These were intended to 
operate as central repositories or ‘one-stop shops’ for the new Local Area Agreements, for the CAA 
results and reports (One place)14 and by the Local Government Leadership Centre for the 13 innovative 
pilots that were intended to help facilitate the next stage of development of the improvement agenda for 
local public services (Total Place).15          
Conclusion 
By 2010, although Fire and Rescue Services had not reached the levels of performance being achieved in 
local authorities, and clearly had potential for further significant improvement, the annual reports and 
scores reflected an increasingly engaged and improving sector with an accelerating and positive direction 
of travel (Audit Commission, 2006. 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b).  The CAA reports published on the CAA 
(One Place) website also showed organisational improvement collaborative improvement and further 
financial improvement in the year that the CAA system operated. 
In early 2010, it was anticipated that the Audit Commission would produce an annual analysis of the 
results of the CAA process and for the first time have a fully comparable assessment of the use being 
made of the public resources being expended across Local Government, Health, Police and Fire Services 
in local communities. The Commission with the assistance of its regulatory partners, should have been 
able to report on the quality and quantity of collaboration, as well as providing individual service 
judgements. It should also be able to give the government the public and the public service delivery 
bodies an idea of the level and speed of improvement of those public services, as well as being able to 
identify and demonstrate areas of innovation and good practice.  
As most readers will know this was not to be, in the next period the Audit Commission was abolished, 
CAA abandoned and no more Local Area Agreements were signed. The emphasis on prevention, 
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protection, service improvement and public service reform in fire as in other public services, was about to 
be succeeded by an emphasis on austerity and reductions in public funding occasioned by a change in 
political control and macro-economic strategy.      
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Notes  
1. A very late narrowing of the gap in support between the two main parties meant the popular vote 
was much closer than seats won. 
2. Key Lines of Enquiry were originally conceptualised and developed by the former Audit 
Commission, but are now used by most public service inspectorates. They direct the focus of an 
inspection or assessment onto critical questions or issues. The inspection teams usually publish 
these in advance and then use a standard set of key lines of enquiry (KLOEs) to all of the service 
delivery bodies. 
3. Following the amalgamation of Devon and Somerset, the number of Fire Services reduced to 46. 
4. The calculation of 3% performance improvement on national indicators was a calculation made 
by analysts on the Intervention Team when evaluating improvement and recovery strategies. The 
3-4% financial savings is a calculation triangulating evidence from the Use of Resources reports, 
the schedules of ‘Gershon’ savings by local authorities and the successive annual’ Invest to Save’ 
programmes. It is little known (except of course by HMT) that the Invest to Save programmes 
undertaken by local authorities consistently outperformed the programmes of central 
government departments and non-departmental public bodies.     
5. The preparation of a community strategy was a requirement of the Local Government Act 2000. 
It sets out a long-term vision for an area (which matches the authorities boundaries), and is 
backed up by action plans to achieve it. Every local authority should prepare a community 
strategy 'for promoting or improving the economic, social and environmental well-being of their 
area and contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in the United Kingdom'. 
The name generally became the Sustainable Community Strategy during the roll-out of LAAS 
and was formally endorsed in the 2007 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health 
Act. 
6. In addition to Local Area Agreements, ‘Multi-Area agreements’ aimed to encourage cross 
boundary partnership working at a geographical scale greater than a single local authority area, 
(either regional or sub-regional). They were not constrained by the three-year timescale of an 
LAA nor by including only revenue expenditure.  Promoted by DCLG as voluntary agreements 
between two or more top tier (county councils or metropolitan district councils) or unitary local 
authorities, their partners and the government to work collectively to either improve services or 
address problems best tackled at a larger scale. Often focussing on economic development, the 
skills agenda and/or transport and access issues they were forerunners to the current debate on 
Combined Authorities.  There were 15 signed off multi-area agreements although there was little 
involvement by Fire and Rescue services or Authorities.  
7. There was a significant reduction in number in national indicators and an improvement in the 
sophistication of individual indicators throughout this period although the potential scope for 
further improvements was always clear.  
8. The core of the evidential base gradually revolved around the Joint Strategic Needs Assessments, 
which had been developing since 2004 but found expression in the 2007 Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act. 
9. There were not one ‘Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations (QUANGOs) 
included on the list at any time, since government by definition did not have control over them. 
The various iterations of the list consisted of Non Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) and 
various government advisory groups. 
10. Table 3 of Chapter 2 illustrates the nature and scope of this ‘improvement’ infrastructure. This 
organisational language was simplified consolidated and strengthened between 2005 and 2010 but 
was effectively decimated after 2010. 
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11. The advantage of having all public services in a single geographical area with the same external 
auditor was quickly acknowledged as a good idea by government, public service deliverers and 
the Audit Commission. 
12. In areas with the two-tier system of Local Government, the Districts were included in the 
assessment of the county council.  
13. Primary Care Trusts as the formal leaders of the local NHS.  
14. Police Authorities did not included specialised or national forces.  
15. The LAA website no longer exists and a sample from the Audit Commissions ‘One Place’ 
website was transferred to the  national archives at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101008004702/http://oneplace.audit-
commission.gov.uk/pages/default.aspx  
16. The Total Place website has been dormant for over 5 years but is at 
http://www.localleadership.gov.uk/totalplace/ 
  
 
 
